Defense policymaking: the post-cold war roles and missions debate. by Hall, Michael A. & Stockton, Paul
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-06
Defense policymaking: the post-cold war roles and
missions debate.
Hall, Michael A.











urity Classification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Report Security Classification: Unclassified lb Restrictive Markings
Security Classification Authority
Declassification/Downgrading Schedule
3 Distribution/Availability of Report
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)








7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey CA 93943-5000
Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization 6b Office Symbol
(if applicable)
9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number
Idress (city, state, and ZIP code) 10 Source of Funding Numbers
Program Element No Project No Task No Work Unit Accession No
Title (UNCLASSIFIED) DEFENSE POLICY MAKING: THE POST-COLD WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE
Personal Author Hall, Michael A.








Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of
£ Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Cosati Codes
Id Group Subgroup
18 Subject Terms Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress, Service Roles Missions and Functions,
Defense Policymaking, Executive Branch, Post-Cold War, Defense Reform, National
Security Act of 1947, The 1948 Key West Agreement, Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis examines the ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy that
minates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. The hypothesis examined is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
d the four military Services will be unable to formulate any significant changes in their own roles and missions because there is a
:hotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and what Congress sees as significant change (read
dget). The Services inability to make change will force Congress to take the lead in the defense reform effort. However,
ngressional efforts to formulate and implement defense policy will prove imperfect again, unless Congress can first reform itself,
eretary Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement defense policy for a post-Cold War environment.
lis thesis begins with a brief overview on the origins of the present day roles and missions debate, and is followed by an
amination of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that provides insight as to how legislators might work with or against the President and
rvices in reallocating service roles and missions. The current debate over service roles and missions is examined along with




same as report DTIC users
21 Abstract Security Classification
Unclassified
a Name of Responsible Individual
ul Stockton




» FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
security classification of this page
Unclassified
T260846D
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DEFENSE POLICYMAKING:
THE POST COLD-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE
by
Michael A. Hall
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., University of South Carolina, 1985
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





This thesis examines the ability of the President, Congress and Armed
Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication
and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. The hypothesis examined is
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four military Services will be unable to
formulate any significant changes in their own roles and missions because of a
dichotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure)
and what Congress sees as significant change (read budget). The Services inability
to make change will force Congress to take the lead in the defense reform effort.
However, congressional efforts to formulate and implement defense policy will
prove imperfect again, unless Congress can first reform itself. Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement defense
policy for a post-Cold War environment. This thesis begins with a brief overview
on the origins of the present day roles and missions debate, and is followed by
an examination of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that provides insight as to how
legislators might work with or against the President and Services in reallocating
service roles and missions. The current debate over service roles and missions is
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Defense Policymaking:
The Post-Cold War Roles And Missions Debate
LT Michael A. Hall, USN
June 1993
The geopolitical changes that have fundamentally altered the threats to U.S.
national security combined with rising budget deficits have created an opportunity
and necessity for change throughout the Department of Defense. These events will
not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but propel an overall reconsideration
of the Services roles, missions and functions. Senator Sam Nunn SASC Chairman,
in a July 2 floor speech entitled, The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul
The Services Roles And Missions, argued that our nation can no longer afford inter-
service rivalry, and that redundancy and duplication in the current allocation of roles
and missions is costing billions of dollars each year.
Senator Nunn's speech on the Senate floor was a mandate for inter-service
debate over roles and missions. The essence of his mandate is his fear that a failure
to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services will lead to
a "diminished" military capability. Nunn's speech was given in anticipation of
General Powell's February 1993 report entitled, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States.
Powell's report suggested ways to make the military more efficient, but did not call
for radically reshaping the four Services. The report "rebuffed" the type of
VI
consolidation that Congress and President Clinton has called for. The dissatisfaction
with the report for its possible lack of vision, highlights what is fast becoming the
preeminent defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.
In response to this defense policy issue, this thesis examines the ability of the
President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and implement defense policy
that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within service roles, missions and
functions. This thesis argues that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four military
Services are unable to formulate any significant changes in their roles, missions and
functions. In support of this claim, the first evidence presented, stems from a
dichotomy between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and
what Congress sees as significant change (read budget). Analysis provided in Chapter
Four by Mackubin Thomas Owens puts this dichotomy into perspective. He argues
that the Strategist (Services), seek military effectiveness at the cost of efficiency as
opposed to Congress who seeks efficiency. The strategist also sees duplication as the
military obligation to have enough means to ensure victory. In addition, it is
complimentary and provides a broad range of unique capabilities that can be brought
to bear as required by the situation. Where Congress may see wasteful duplication,
the military planner sees an array of tools that will allow him/her to carryout a variety
of operations and meet strategic requirements. In addition to the dichotomy between
the Services and Congress, institutional barriers, sunk costs and use of uncertainty
and threat all factor in the inability of the Services to reform themselves.
Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that realigns,
vn
consolidates or abolishes service roles and missions, is much harder to determine.
This thesis argues three reasons as to why Congress is not well suited to formulate
defense policy that seeks to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within service
roles and missions. First, formulating defense policy regarding service roles and
missions would be doing what critics argue as something it is institutionally not well
suited to do. Robert Art argues it is the job of the Executive Branch to initiate policy
and that of the Congress to judge policy.
Although "Congress tends to abhor a policy vacuum/' and will push for their
own proposals for change, this is not the case with roles and missions. This leads to
the second reason: the impact upon the budget Unlike past reform efforts that were
centered around structure and authority i.e., Goldwater-Nichols, legislation associated
with reorganizing service roles and missions is centered around budget line-items.
The third point is constituent-oriented concerns. Eliminating roles and missions may
prove too difficult for legislators who are less concerned with formulating policy and
more concerned with satisfying narrow constituent-oriented concerns.
This thesis concludes that the Executive Branch under the leadership of
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement
significant defense policy. Several factors are presented in ChapterV that must occur,
if Aspin is to be successful. First, Clinton must back Aspin with the required
political capital. Second, the Clinton Administration must produce a National
Security Strategy and Military Strategy that provides a vision outlining U.S. interests
and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review
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of roles and missions. Third, Aspin must have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Services. The upcoming selection of the new CJCS is critical to the
administration. Their choice must be visionary and posses strong leadership that can
unite the Services in supporting future reform. Les Aspin's congressional experience
coupled with his systems analyst approach to doing business, will prove successful
in his quest to shape the Services for a post-Cold War environment Aware of
institutional and bureaucratic barriers, Aspin will seek a defense policy that reflects
his congressional experience and be a policy workable to both Services and Congress.
The thesis conclusion is that while the Services are the least likely group
capable of proposing any changes, the Executive Branch is the most likely to
formulate and implement significant defense reform. Congress, on the other hand
will avoid policy formulation because judging policy is something it is institutionally
not well suited to do. Congress does play a "de facto" role in policy implementation
through appropriations. However, Congress will be reluctant to enact significant




The world's strategic landscape has changed dramatically over the past
four years. In addition, the nation's fiscal situation is creating great pressures
to utilize military capabilities more efficiently and will compel a new look at
service roles and functions, which may well lead to changes in U.S. force
structure and defense policy. The Clinton administration has already
denounced the Bush administrations Base Force plan as ill-suited for the post-
Cold War world. Clinton has also proclaimed his desire for military
reorganization to eliminate duplication, such as separate air forces and many
service support functions. In addition, Clinton has proposed using the Services
for domestic missions, such as infrastructure, education and rural health
problems. 1
The post-Cold War environment, compounded with the current budget
deficit crisis, has compelled Senator Nunn to launch a debate regarding the
elimination of duplication and inefficiencies within the Services roles, missions
and functions. Amidst declining defense budgets, Congress, the Services, and
Executive Branch are faced with the challenge of realigning, consolidating or
even abolishing service roles and missions. This thesis examines the ability of
William Mathews, "There will be change, but it will take time," Army Times, 16
November 1992, 12.
Congress, the Services and Executive Branch to formulate and impliment
defense policy shaped for a post-Cold War era.
Geopolitical changes have fundamentally altered the threats to U.S.
national security. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact virtually ended the
chances of a major East-West conventional war in Europe, thus eliminating the
rationale for maintaining large U.S. standing forces in Europe and large reserve
forces at home that could be rapidly mobilized. This era also witnessed the
former Soviet Union reach agreement with the United States on wide-ranging
reductions in strategic and conventional forces. Enhanced East-West
cooperation has been characterized by even deeper cuts to strategic nuclear
forces as outlined by current START II levels. Joint support for military action
in the Persian Gulf coupled with Western economic assistance in the
restructuring of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union further illustrate
East-West cooperation.
In addition to East-West cooperation, the United States is facing a
significant fiscal crisis. The budget deficit for 1992 was estimated at 290.2
billion dollars.2 Table 1 illustrates under current policy the projected growth
of the budget deficit through fiscal year 2003.
2Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and
Revenue Options, A report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget,
February 1993, p.4.
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Source: Congressional Budget Office February 1993
These projections assume that laws are not changed and that discretionary
spending keeps up with inflation once the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) caps
expire. Deficits will jump from $310 billion in fiscal year 1993 to $653 billion
by fiscal year 2003. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the
federal deficit would decline from five percent to four percent between 1993
and 1996, rising again to almost seven percent by 2003. In 2003, the federal
deficit will reach its largest percentage of GDP in more than 50 years.3
What does a budget deficit crisis coupled with a post Cold-War security
environment mean to the United States? Change! The end of the Cold War
combined with budgetary constraints have created an opportunity and necessity
3
Ibid., 6.
for change throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). There are very few
who would argue against the need for the U.S. to maintain a well equipped
and trained military. However, escalating federal deficits have brought about
the need for reductions in government spending. Augmented by the collapse
of the USSR, formerly the nation's greatest adversary and primary justification
for defense appropriations, DOD's budget becomes a realistic target for
reduction.
These events will not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but
propel an overall reconsideration of the basic organization of DOD. According
to Vincent Davis, one of the primary reasons for reorganization is the desire for
more efficiency in government, and the elimination of waste and duplication.4
James Blackwell and Barry Blechman illustrate this point by indicating that
Congress since reorganizing U.S. defense organization in 1947 "has intervened
repeatedly (with more than twenty major bills enacted into law) to redirect that
organization in ways that would improve its effectiveness and efficiency."5 In
addition, they argue that "Congress has a constitutional duty to oversee the
management of DOD to ensure that the will of the governed is carried out."6
4Vincent Davis, "The Evolution of Central U.S. Defense Management," in
Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Robert Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel
Huntington (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 149-150.
5James A. Blackwell Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, Making Defense Reform
Work (Brassey's (US),INC, Washington, New York, 1990), 266.
*Ibid.
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Redundancy and duplication within the Armed Services has once again
made its way to the forefront. Sparked by the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC), a debate over service roles, missions, and functions has
been raised. 7 Senator Sam Nunn D-GA., SASC Chairman, in a July 2 floor
speech entitled, The Defense DepartmentMust Thoroughly Overhaul The Services
Roles And Missions, argued that our nation can no longer afford interservice
rivalry, and that redundancy and duplication in the current allocation of roles
and missions is costing billions of dollars each year.8
Senator John McCain R-AZ. also called for Chairman Powell and Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney "to provide Congress with a 'strong message on roles
and missions' of the Services."9 There are many, including Senator John
Warner R-VA., who feel it "is too much to expect the Pentagon to propose any
7The terms "roles, missions, and functions" have been used interchangeably
and often times incorrectly throughout this research. For this thesis, as defined
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the terms "roles, missions, and
functions have the following meanings: Roles are the broad and enduring
purposes for which the Services were established by Congress in law.
Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the
combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Functions are specific
responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable
the Services to fulfill their legally established roles.
8Nunn, Sam, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The
Service Roles And Missions," Floor Speech, 2 July 1992.
'William Mathews, "On a role: Lawmakers rev up to restructure the
military," Army Times, 10 August 1992, 28.
sweeping changes/' to service roles and missions.10 Senator McCain's
challenge to Powell is a call to set inter-service rivalry and service parochialism
aside, thus, allowing a roles and missions report to be presented that eliminates
needless redundancy and duplication. As Senator Nunn indicates, "We must
find ways to save billions of dollars with streamlining and eliminating the
duplication."11
Section 153(b) of Title 10, United States Code, enacted as part of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, requires
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to the Secretary of Defense
a report containing recommendations for changes in the assignment of roles,
missions and functions to the armed forces as the Chairman considers
necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Services. The Chairman in
his report is required to address changes in the nature of threats faced by the
U.S.; unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces; and changes
in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.12
In the Chairman's February 1993 report entitled, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces
10Rick Maze, "Role review holds up weapons," Army Times, 24 August 1992,
21.
"Mathews, 28.
"United States Code, Title 10 Armed Forces, Vol.III, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988.
of the United States, Powell suggest ways to make the military more efficient,
but does not call for radically reshaping the four Services. The report has
"rebuffed" the type of consolidation that Congress and President Clinton has
called for. In addition, the report has been interpreted as "more noteworthy for
its objection to the view that Washington should eliminate duplication by
realigning the missions of the three military services."13 According to Floyd
Spence R-SC, ranking republican on the House Armed Services Committee,
"For many in congress, there is too much of a status quo in the report, . . ."14
In Powell's defense, it can be argued that duplication in service roles and
missions does provide an additional margin of security.
Indicating General Powell's report represents an important first step,
Secretary Of Defense (SecDef) Les Aspin on 30 March 1993 called for a second
roles and missions report. A roles and missions report is traditionally
produced once every three years. However, a provision does exist to make the
report due upon request from the President or Secretary of Defense. Aspin's
announcement illustrates the dissatisfaction with the current Powell report for
its possible lack of vision, and undoubtedly highlights, what is fast becoming
the preeminent defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.
"Michael R. Gordon, "Report By Powell Challenges Calls To Revise
Military," New York Times, 31 December 1992, Al.
14David C. Morrison, "Role Call," National lournal, 20 March 1993, 690.
During his election campaign, President Bill Clinton indicated that he will
act quickly in launching a reassessment of service roles and missions. He
stated that as President he would call a meeting similar to the 1948 Key West
Conference at which the service chiefs set the missions of the Army, Navy Air
Force and Marine Corps. Clinton's goal is to have the service chiefs "hammer
out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military roles
and missions in the 1990s and beyond."15
This thesis will examine the ability of the President, Congress and Armed
Services to formulate and implement defense policy that eliminates duplication
and inefficiencies within service roles, missions and functions. I will argue
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in conjunction with the four military Services
will be unable to formulate any significant changes in their roles missions and
functions. The Services inability to make change will force Congress to take
the lead in the defense reform effort. However, congressional efforts to
formulate and implement defense policy will prove imperfect again, unless
Congress can first reform itself. Finally, I will argue that the Executive Branch
under the guidance and leadership of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has the
best opportunity to formulate and implement defense policy shaped for a post-
Cold War environment.
"William Mathews, There will be change, 12.
Chapter II begins with a brief overview on the origins of the present day
roles and missions debate. This chapter examines the National Security Act of
1947, the 1948 Key West Agreement, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958
and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA). Chapter III examines the
process of reform with an inside look at GNA. An understanding of the
defense reform process of GNA provides valuable insight as to how legislators
might work with or against the President and Services, in reallocating service
roles and missions.
Chapter IV lays out the current debate over service roles, missions and
functions, and illustrates its importance amidst a declining defense budget.
Chapter Five examines the constraints and implications of defense
policymaking in regards to the ability of Congress, Services and Executive
Branch to realign, consolidate or even abolish service roles and missions.
Chapter VI will provide my conclusions.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT DAY ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE
Prior to the development of airplanes, concerns over service roles and
missions was limited. The division between land and sea was rather distinct.
However, along with the airplane came controversy over its use. The seacoast
line had instinctively led to attempts to define an earth-water approach to the
problem, but as range and striking power of the airplane increased, so did the
problems. What developed was inter-service differences over aircraft
procurement based upon interpretation of missions. These difficulties
prompted Mr. H. Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Air to issue
the following 1930 statement:
There is serious duplication between the Army and Navy . . . with
reference to land-based aircraft in coast defense. This . . results in
unnecessary expenditures for the national defense and in a confused and
therefore inefficient conception of the relative functions of the two
services.16
The theme of Mr. Davison's remark is very similar to today's roles and
missions debate against needless redundancy and duplication. The roles and
missions as they are currently written today, represent compromises reached
over 45 years ago. The compromise, known as the Key West agreement, gave
"Cited in, Lawrence J. Legere, Jr. "Unification Of The Armed Forces," (Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1950), 157.
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each service more or less what it wanted, at the price of redundancy, and
therefore greater cost.17
This chapter examines the origins of the present day roles and missions
debate. The chapter is divided into five sections, beginning with the National
Security Act of 1947. This section serves to illustrate the controversey created
over service roles and missions from the need for unification of command.
Section B describes the contentious compromise that shaped service roles and
missions, that we still live with today. Section C examines the 1958 Defense
Reorganization Act that sought centralization of defense management for the
purpose of improving the efficiency and economical operation of the Services.
Section D examines congressional concerns related to the unification effort
from post-WWII to pre-Goldwater-Nichols. The last section looks at the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA). GNA illustrates Congress' attempt to
once again reform the Defense Department organizational structure without
addressing (as did the other laws) the assignment of service roles and missions.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Shortly after World War II senior military and political leaders struggled
with lessons learned from the war. The most significant lesson was the need
for unification of command. The global nature of the war had emphasized the
17Morton H. and David Halperin, "The Key West Key," Foreign Policy 53,
(Winter 1983-84): 116-117.
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importance of having one commander responsible for all assets in a given
theater.
In April 1943 a division in Army Service Force was created to begin
planning for the post-war period. Their work was highley regarded and within
three months the division was constituted as the Special Planning Division
(SPD) of the War Department Special Staff. On 3 November 1943, General
Marshall submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum entitled A
Single Department of War in the Post-War Period. His memorandum was an
endorsement of an SPD study that recommended reorganizing the defense
establishment into one department with one civilian secretary. In addition, the
department would have one chief of staff, one military high command and
unified service branches for air, sea and ground warfare.18
The Navy took exception, finding the plan a challenge to its own
existence. In response, the Navy created a buffer recommending working
defense matters through agencies and cooperative ventures. The Navy wanted
the Services to remain separate, and to cooperate with each other on a range of
tasks only. 19
18Legere, 264-275.
"General Russel E. Dougherty, USAF, Retired, "ROOTS AND WINGS A
PERSPECTIVE ON REORGANIZATION," Air Power Journal (Summer 1992):
8-9.
12
Debate over the unification of the armed forces ultimately led to the
signing of the National Security Act of 1947, also known as the Unification Act.
In restructuring, the Unification Act established the Department of Defense
headed by a secretary of defense, separated the Air Force from the Army, and
gave legal status to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.20 The Army, Navy, and Marine
Corps retained equivalent degrees of autonomy, and both the Navy and
Marines kept their aviation components. The Air Force was the real winner in
that it became a separate service on 18 September 1947, the day the act became
effective. Because there was compromise there were shortfalls. The act failed
to specify which of the Services should be given authority to do what. The
Navy strongly urged that each service be given all the forces that would be
necessary to carry out its mission independently. In contrast, the Army and Air
Force argued that such a move would create unnecessary duplication of forces
and that they should work together as a team. Unable to resolve these
differences, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal summoned all the joint chiefs
to Key West Naval Base in March 1948.21
20There were two other key provisions of the Unification Act not associated
with the Pentagon: The creation of the National Security Council and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
21Morton H. David Halperin, "Rewriting The Key West Accord," in
Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis and Samuel
P. Huntington (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985, 346.
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B. THE 1948 KEY WEST AGREEMENT
Prior to Key West, President Truman attempted to thwart the interservice
rivalry that was causing the controversy over roles and missions. He went after
the Navy's desire to possess land-based air and naval reconnaissance,
antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. Truman sent a letter to
Navy Secretary Forrestal and Secretary of War John Patterson outlining his
vision of the roles and missions of the Services. The letter called for the Air
Force to maintain land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine
warfare, and protection of shipping. Of course, this presidential position sent
the Navy through the roof.22
A similar letter was sent to the Senate and House committees on Military
and Naval Affairs. This letter became Executive Order 9877 (EO 9877). The
Navy became so openly irritated over the Air Force role that President Truman
rescinded his order and told Secretary of Defense Forrestal to issue the
'functions' directive himself.23 Eight months later, on March 11-14, 1948,
Secretary Forrestal took unprecedented action by taking all the Joint Chiefs
down to Key West, Florida.24
"Dougherty, 9.
"After the unification legislation was passed, Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal was made the first Secretary of Defense. Secretary of War John
Patterson was Truman's first choice, but he declined.
"Dougherty, 9.
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The four-day retreat in Key West produced the now famous Key West
agreement. The inter-service treaty negotiated at Key West was entitled
"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and approved by
President Truman. The Key West agreement was centered around two subjects:
the powers and functions of the JCS and the jurisdictional problem raised by
service roles and missions. In regards to the powers and functions of the JCS,
the conference agreed:
to emphasize the duty of the Joint Chiefs to provide the Defense
Department, as guide lines for the development of its various programs,
integrated, or unified, military staff plans, rather than compilations of
service oriented plans. This has been described as a shaky compromise at
best.25
According to Paul Hammond, this agreement "added little or nothing to the
status quo," because this was already an agreed upon objective of the National
Security Act of 1947.26
The agreement over the assignment of service roles and missions was
nothing more than an endorsement of each individual Services proposal. The
JCS, a committee of equals, failed to negotiate among the specific service
proposals and even disagreed about correct interpretation before publication.27
25Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military
Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), 237-238.
26Ibid.
27John C. Ries, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of
the U.S. Armed Services . (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964) 126.
15
The outcome of the Key West agreement proved beneficial for the Navy.
By retaining the Navy-based Marine Corps and authority to provide close air
support for Marine land operations, the Navy retained many of its goals. In
addition, the Navy gained the authority to carry out ground launched missions
necessary for sea battles. According to David and Morton Halperin, the Army
and the Air Force were willing to give the Navy control over almost all sea
operations in order to avoid excessive duplication. The Army and the Air Force
agreed to cooperate with each other as a team on joint missions. For example,
the Air Force pledged to provide the Army with airlift and close air support.28
Although Key West set up a basic structure of responsibilities and
missions, interservice disputes did not stop. Each service had its own programs
to protect and didn't want to waste valuable budget dollars and resources on
programs designed to aid the other Services. Airlift, sealift and close air
support (CAS) provide good examples for the Army. Both the Navy and the
Air Force neglected their responsibilities to the Army in order to concentrate







C THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958
On 18 November 1952, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett sent
President Eisenhower a letter on service organization. He concluded in his
letter that service organizational structure was unacceptable and unworkable.
Lovett recommended to Eisenhower that a thorough functional and
organizational study of DOD take place.30
President Eisenhower was well aware of the existing problems between
the services and in 1952 he convened the Rockefellar Commission to study
Defense Department operations and make recommendations for improvement.
The report of the commission stressed the need for strengthened civilian
control, improved strategic planning, and effectiveness with the economy.31
In early 1958, Eisenhower sent Congress a message conveying the concept of
truly unifying the operational commands. He stressed that each unified
commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of the command.
President Eisenhower concluded his message by stating:
I recommend, therefore, that present law, including certain restrictions
relating to combatant functions, be so amended as to remove any possible
obstacles to the full unity of our commands and the full command over
them by unified commanders.32
30Dougherty, 10
31John C Ries, 150-151.
32Dougherty, 10.
17
President Eisenhower followed with a draft bill recommending his philosophy.
Despite the raging dispute that ensued, most of Eisenhower's recommendations
became law.33
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 had one other significant
dimension. It gave the Defense Secretary the statutory authority he needed to
exert centralized control over the Services through the budgetary process.
While not providing for an actual merger of the armed forces, the 1958 Act gave
the Defense Secretary the power to take any steps he deemed necessary to
improve the efficiency and economical operation of the Defense Department,
including authority enabling "... the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and
consolidation of functions" of the Services.34 Armed with this statutory
authority and the management techniques of program budgeting, it became the




34Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law 85-599
(85th Congress) : sec. 3(c) (1).
35Robert McNamara became the first Secretary of Defense to use the
statutory authority provided by the 1958 Act to exert centralized control over
the services through the budgetary process. The Tactical Fighter, Experimental
(TFX) decision was McNamara's first opportunity to do so. McNamara's story
is beyond the purview of this paper. However, Robert J. Art offers an excellent




Congressional involvement throughout post-WWII reorganization efforts
has centered around a very unique characteristic: Congress' concern over the
powers of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, the secretaries authority to
determine the roles and missions of the Services. Although Congress
traditionally has resisted attempts to centralize the Defense Department, they
have consistently given in to executive pressures to do so. However, with one
exception, the matter of service roles and missions.36
In the development of the 1947 National Security Act, the concern of
service roles and missions became a major issue of unification. The two
competing philosophies at the time was either to merge the Services or preserve
the military departments as separate and independent agencies. The problem
Congress saw with a merger of the Services was the plan to have the director
of the merged forces assign roles and missions to the Services. On the other
hand, the Navy plan to maintain separate Services defeated a major objective
of unification: the elimination of needless duplication. John Ries best explains
Congress' dilemma:
The roles and missions issue was not simply a matter of administrative
centralization or decentralization. It was a problem of legislative-executive
relations. If Congress permitted any executive officer to reallocate or
restrict service roles and missions, it would be delegating him some of its




consolidate or reassign service functions, its prerogatives would be
preserved, but existing duplication would be perpetuated.37
Congress resolved its dilemma by writing a preamble to the National Security
Act. The preamble provided for the continued existence of the three services,
including the Marine Corps and naval aviation, and their assigned functions.
In addition, Congress agreed to the promulgation of an executive order, which
allocated functions in greater detail.3* This was the beginning of many
contentious debates between Congress and the Executive Branch regarding
authority over the assignment of roles and missions to the services.
Less than two years later, Congress with some resistance, amended the
National Security Act favorably to the type of organization the Secretary of
Defense wanted. The 1949 Amendments, most notably, eliminated the service
secretaries from the National Security Council and added a non-voting
chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goal of these changes were to deny
the Services a direct role in defense policymaking. Although Congress created
the type of organization the secretary wanted, "it did not intend to lose its own
prerogatives in the process."39 According to the "Executive Branch,







the point that although Congress might agree, "it also realized its own need for
access to the Services to makes its policy function meaningful."40
Ries argues that Congress needs to hear disagreement and controversy
from the Services, because disagreement means alternatives. Examining and
judging alternatives equates to congressional control. Ries states,
Congress took its constitutional mandate to provide for the common
defense very seriously. If the secretary successfully eliminated inter-
service rivalry and secured agreement within the department, Congress
would be reduced to accepting whatever the secretary recommended. 41
Congress was not going to accept this course of action under any circumstances.
Congress followed the premise that "policy can be put to no valid test beyond
the agreement of those charged with the responsibility for executing it."42
Congress wanted to be sure that the Services had the opportunity to express
their view in the defense policymaking process.
The 1958 Defense Reorganization Act once again saw Congress faced with
the request to allow the Secretary of Defense greater authority to determine
service roles and missions. Congress was incensed at the proposal to reduce
its role in this area. Congress' main concern under the new proposals was its
inability to prevent an undesirable action of the secretary. Congress would








According to Carl Vinson Chairman House Armed Services Committee, "If
service roles and missions were removed from law and made subject to
executive determination, little would remain for Congress except to appropriate
funds."43
The argument the secretary put forth in calling for greater power over
service roles and missions, was to develop "truly unified" combatant
commands. Congressional hearings witnessed numerous testimonies insisting
upon this power, but "no illustration of this need were provided."44 Congress
began to sense another use to which the power might be used. Congress
believed that the administration wanted the power to change the three Services
rather than develop "truly unified" commands. After intense congressional
questioning of administration officials, Congress concluded that despite the
denial of any inappropriate use of increased secretarial power, the possibility
did exist for an alteration of the Services for reasons other than to develop
unity in combatant commands. Ries offers an excellent summary of this
debate:
Whatever the true motives of the administration in requesting such a
broad grant for power from Congress, the manner in which the request
was justified and the lack of restrictions surrounding the proposed
authorization antagonized Congress. As might be suspected, Congress, in
the final working of the reorganization bill, insured its participation. It




provided for congressional veto of any proposed alteration of combatant
functions by the passage of a disapproving resolution in either House.45
The post-WWII defense reorganization effort, that has sought unification and
the elimination of duplication and inefficiencies, has been characterized by the
Executive Branch's drive for greater centralization and Congress' attempts to
draw the line beyond which centralization is not to go. The result has led to
a greater centralization of the Defense Department. However, it can be argued
that congressional limitations over the control of service roles, missions and
functions, have compounded interservice rivalry and therefore has led to the
duplication and inefficiencies that exist today.
E. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
Although the 1958 Act provided positive legislation towards unification,
many in the Services were slow to fully appreciate or even understand the
changes in command relationships. General Russell E. Dougherty, USAF,
Retired, argued that the Services failed to pay much attention to the unified
and specified command structure. He indicated that the service chiefs ran their
forces through the service component commands without much CINC
involvement. It was his observation that, "by and large, we lived with some





Failures of the military to coordinate operations during the Vietnam
conflict, the Iranian rescue mission, the attempt to develop a sea-based MX, and
the 1983 invasion of Grenada, are but a few examples that led Congress to once
again focus upon reforming the Defense Department organizational
structure.
47 In the words of former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger:
... in the absence of structural reform ... I feel the United States will
obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of
military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate
with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence
and defense posture available to the nation.48
The 1986 Goldwater - Nichols Act provided changes in the Unified and
Specified command structure designed to increase the input of the commanders
into the process of developing budgetary and force structure priorities. The
goal with this change is to redirect funding into vital areas traditionally
ignored by the individual Services, such as airlift and sealift. A second area
of major change mandated by GNA concerns the role of the Joint Staff. Instead
of working for the JCS as a corporate body, the Joint Staff is now to work
solely for the Chairman. This change was designed to prevent officers with
parochial concerns from exerting undue influence over subordinates. Among
the most highly publicized, and certainly the most controversial of the changes
in the defense organizational structure mandated by GNA, are those which
47Halperin, 344-358.
48
U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff
Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 99th Congress: III.
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affect the roles and authority of the JCS. Basically, the powers of the JCS
Chairman were increased significantly by giving him an independent voice.49
The intent of Congress was to allow the Chairman to over rule the opinions of
the parochial service chiefs:
The fundamental purpose of this bill is to refine the role of the chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff. The bill would enable the chairman ... to
transcend the service-orientation of the respective service chiefs to provide
clear-cut, objective military advice to the national command authorities.50
Goldwater - Nichols has been acclaimed as successful legislation. However, it
still failed (as did the other laws) to address the assignment of roles and
missions of the military departments. 51
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to illustrate the origins of the
present day roles and missions debate. The development of the airplane led
to inter-service differences over aircraft procurement based upon interpretation
of missions. These difficulties created an inefficient conception of the relative
functions between the Services. The redundancy and duplication that resulted,
illustrate the very core of today's roles and missions debate.
The attempt to resolve the issue of roles and missions resulted in a
compromise that was nothing more than an endorsement of each individual
49Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,
Public Law 99-433 (100 Stat. 992-1000), 99th Congress: sec. 402.
50
U.S., Congress, House, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985,
Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622,
(Report 99-375, 99th Congress: 2.
51Nunn, Floor Speech, 2.
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Services proposal. The compromise, known as the Key West agreement, gave
each service more or less what it wanted, at the price of redundancy, and
therefore greater cost. Although Key West set up a basic structure of
responsibilities and missions, inter-service disputes did not stop. In order to
protect valuable budget dollars for individual programs, each service neglected
secondary missions designed to support one another.
In a quest to improve the efficiency of the Services, the 1958 Defense
Reorganization Act was passed giving the Secretary of Defense the statutory
authority to exert centralized control over the Services through the budgetary
process. It was his goal to bring an end to inter-service rivalry and
parochialism, therefore duplication and inefficiencies. However, the problem
that stood in his way was Congress. Congressional limitations placed upon the
Executive Branch were legislated to insure the continued existence of the
Services, and for that matter naval aviation. Congress was not going to usurp
what it saw as its constitutional duty to provide for the common defense.
Failures of the military to coordinate operations prompted Congress to
pursue further defense reorganization. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act
basically sought to refine the role of the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff,
with the hope of eliminating inter-service logrolling and producing sound
military advice to the national command authorities. Although GNA has been
labeled the most significant defense reorganization effort since the 1947
26
National Security Act, it still failed to address the assignment of service roles
and missions.
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III. THE PROCESS OF REFORM: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
With changes in U.S. forces and defense policies inevitable, how might
the President, Congress and the Armed Services carry out the reallocation of
service roles and missions? In the study of this question, it is necessary to look
at past defense reorganization. This chapter examines how and why the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (GNA) came about. An understanding of the
defense reform process of GNA provides valuable insight as to how legislators
might work with or against the President and Services in reallocating service
roles and missions.
There is a unique similarity between GNA and the current roles and
missions debate. Both defense policy initiatives were spurred by congressional
activism. This has important implications for the Executive Branch and
Services in regards to future defense reform. Congressional activism implies
that the Executive Branch and/or Services must be proactiye in responding to
the demand for change, or take what the Congress mandates. Those involved
in the policymaking arena within the Services and Executive Branch should be
asking the question: How can the Services and or Executive Branch present
sound defendable suggestions for change that preempt Congress' attempt to
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formulate overall defense policy?52 This concept will be further developed in
chapter five.
The campaign that ultimately led to the passage of GNA on 1 October
1986, began in a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
on 3 February, 1982, with the testimony by General David C. Jones, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of staff, over concerns about basic shortcomings in the
organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Jones' fundamental argument
was that the current JCS organization "tended to evolve policy by compromises
that accommodated the bureaucratic interests of the individual Services."53
His announcement came as a surprise to many, since it came from a
uniformed officer and someone from inside the system. General Jones offered
the following justification for his actions:
Although I recognize the very strong and persistent headwinds, I could
not leave office in good conscience this summer without making a major
effort to illuminate the real issues once more and hopefully wrest some
substantial changes. Most of the problems and some of the approaches
I will address have been discovered-then reburied-many times in the past
35 years. The difference this time is that the proposals for improvement
are coming from someone inside the system, who has been in the best
"Paul Stockton offers an excellent discussion on how "policy vacuums"
influence congressional behavior in "CONGRESS AND DEFENSE
POLICYMAKING FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA," to be published in
James M. Lindsay and Randall Ripley, EDS., Congress Resurgent: Foreign and
Defense Policy On Capitol Hill, (Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press,
1993)
53Pat Towell, "Gen. Jones Asked changes: House Bill Would Strengthen
Joint Chiefs Chairman's Role," Congressional Quarterly (28 August 1982): 2132.
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position to understand the causes and consequences of its
shortcomings.54
Jones made it clear that the problem was not with individuals, but was an
organizational one. He concluded, as an observer and participant in joint
activities for over 20 years, and having witnessed six different chairmen and
dozens of service chiefs, that the basic problems have continued regardless of
who was in office. As a minimum, Jones recommended changes in three
specific areas: (1) Strengthen the role of the chairman. (2) Limit Service staff
involvement in the joint process. (3) Broaden the training, experience, and
rewards for joint duty.55
Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, joined Jones in criticizing
the JCS structure and suggested that he had not gone far enough in his
recommendations for change.56 Meyer offered his own proposals. Coupled
with those from Jones, this effect led to HASC Investigations Subcommittee
hearings on JCS reorganization beginning April 21, 1982. Testimony was
received from over 40 witnesses. Results of the subcommittee uncovered near
54David C. Jones, General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Why the




56Edward C. Meyer, General USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, "The
JCS-How Much Reform Is needed?" armed forces lournal international 120
(April 1982): 82.
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unanimous agreement that organizational problems existed and were affecting
JCS and Joint Staff performance.
The House Armed Services Committee responded by producing HR 6954,
sponsored by Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Richard C. White, D-
Texas. The bill authorized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to
provide his own personal military advice to the President and Secretary of
Defense. In addition, HR 6954 created the post of deputy chairman, to be filled
by a full admiral or full general from the service other than the chairman's.
The overall intent of the bill was to suppress the parochial interests of the
individual Services, by increasing the power of the CJCS. The bill did fail to
include one of Jone's recommendations to curb the influence of the service
staffs in Joint Chiefs' deliberations.57 The decision to allow the service chiefs
to maintain their dual responsibility parallels the same concerns Congress had
in pre-GNA reorganization efforts. As was mentioned in Chapter II, Congress
wanted to be sure that the Services had the opportunity to express their views
concerning resource allocation, roles and missions, and doctrine.
The House passed HR 6954 by voice vote on 16 August 1982. However,
not without reservations. HASC acknowledged concern over the concept of
shifting the balance of bureaucratic power from the Services to the Chairman
"U.S., Congress, House, loint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985,
Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R. 3622,
(Report 99-375), 99th Congress.
31
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Chairman White indicated "the
committee was not prepared to conclude that the JCS system was "fatally
flawed' because of the dual responsibilities of the service chiefs." 58 Chairman
White, indicated that the goal of the bill was intended more to stimulate
further reforms within the Pentagon not requiring legislation. HR 6954 died
at the end of the 97th Congress for the lack of Senate Action. 59
Congress' inaction on HR 6954 may have marked the end of the first stage
in the development of GNA, but it also marked the beginning of growing
opposition to the idea of defense reorganization. Increasing the JCS chairman's
power at the expense of the services created momentous opposition from
within DOD. Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
was in full disagreement with all of Jones' proposals. Hayward illustrated his
resentment to reorganization by indicating he was
deeply offended by the slanderous criticisms which one frequently hears
about the Joint Chiefs being an ineffective group of parochial service
chiefs who spend most of their time bickering among themselves,
horsetrading to preserve their turf and what is best for their service.60
Marine Commandant General Robert H. Barrow was also in disagreement
with Jones' proposals, warning that they would harm the system by preventing
"Towell, 2133.
59Pat Towell, "Reagan Administration Opposes Measure: House Votes
Increased Role For Chairman of Joint Chiefs," Congressional Quarterly, (22
October 1983), 2166.
^Admiral Thomas B. Hayward cited in Pat Towell, "Gen. Jones Asked
Changes," 2133.
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the development of alternatives that should be presented to civilian
authority.61
Opposition to defense reorganization did not stop with the Services. The
Reagan Administration made its opposition known with the 17 October 1983
passage of HR 3718. HR 3718 was a continuation of the previous year's HR
6954. It too sought an increase in stature for the Chairman of JCS as an
independent military counsel to the President. HASC intentions while drafting
the bill was hopefully to boost military advice to a level that would provide
more impact on national decision making. However, the bill was not perceived
in that manner. The Reagan administration, via William H. Taft IV, argued
that the existing system had served the nation well and there was no need for
change. He also warned of the lack of civilian control over the military that
might result from any such legislation."
Although HR 3718 died due to Senate inaction, great strides were made
in June 1983. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) began to look at
decision making in DOD. An investigation much broader in scope than the
House committee's inquiry into JCS reform began with 12 hearings and 31
witnesses. Much credit was given to SASC Chairman John Tower R-Texas, and
"Ibid
62'Towell, "Reagan Administration Opposes Measure," 2166.
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ranking minority member Scoop Jackson D-Washington, for this
undertaking.63
Giving credit to SASC Chairman Tower proved rather ironic. It was not
until Senator Barry Goldwater R-Arizona succeeded Tower as Chairman of
SASC in 1985 that any serious talk of defense reorganization took place. Under
Tower, SASC hearings were held, but no bills were acted on. Proponents of
change argued that SASC's inaction was due in part to Tower's opposition.
The case can be made that Tower was receptive to the Navy viewpoint against
elements of reorganization, having been influenced as a member of the Navy
Reserve.64
Goldwater succeeding Tower in 1985 marked the beginning of a second
stage in the process of reform. A congressional surge began to take form.
After nearly four years of attempted reform by the House, four separate bills
were introduced in August 1985. HR 2265, sponsored by subcommittee
Chairman Bill Nichols, D-Alabama, contained provisions of the previous bill
HR 3718. HR 2165 (Ike Skelton, D-Missouri), and HR 2710 (full committee
Chairman Les Aspin, D-Wisconsin), established the JCS chairman as the
principal military advisor, but differed in other particulars. HR 2314 also
"Congress, Senate, Senator Goldwater of Arizona speaking on the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 99th Congress.,
Congressional Record (7 May 1986), S5463-4.
64Pat Towell, "Revamping the Pentagon's 'Corporate Board'," Congressional
Quarterly, (August 24, 1985), 1679.
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sponsored by Skelton, would have abolished the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint
Staff in favor of a centralized staff headed by a chief of staff to the President
and Secretary of Defense.65
In addition to the House bills, Senator Goldwater and SASC senior
committee Democrat, Sam Nunn, initiated under their co-chairmanship a nine-
member task force to study defense organizational issues. They also initiated
a more vigorous study effort of a staff study on organization and decision-
making procedures of DOD.66 Nunn's aggressiveness with defense
reorganization was illustrated when he allotted the issue SASC's highest
priority for 1985 and as much time as needed in 1986. 67 Goldwater, from the
time he took over chairmanship of SASC, announced repeatedly that defense
reorganization would be his number one priority for the remainder of his
Senate career. 68
With activism on the rise in the Senate and House, Pentagon opposition
was on the rise as well. The passage of HR 3622 was a House compromise
65
U.S., Congress, House, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985,
Report from the House Committee on Armed Services to Accompany H.R.
3622," (Report 99-375), 99th Congress, 5.
66
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^Pat Towell, "Stiff Opposition From Defense Officials: Pentagon
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(8 March 1986): 572.
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based on the four earlier House bills. The bill basically sought to give civilian
policy makers a better opportunity to hear military advice free of parochial
interest. Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger and Navy Secretary John F.
Lehman Jr., both testified against anyi reorganization attempts as unnecessary.
Lehman, testifying before HASC subcommittee, aggressively attacked Congress
with the following charge:
I think the problem in Defense, and in each of the issues that you have
been addressing these last years, starts with Congress. I think that
Congress is failing today, as an institution, to carry out the
responsibilities that were laid upon it by the Founding Fathers in the
Constitution.69
Lehman predicated his attack to the proposal of a bureaucractic solution
and the further centralization of DOD, that has been the very cause of the
dysfunctions being focused upon. He warned the subcommittee panel that if
Congress anointed the chairman as an independent source of unified and
ostensibly bias-free advice, he might become the sole source of military advice.
Lehman argued, "What Secretary of Defense, no matter how highly regarded,
no matter how well qualified, can stand against a unified military with one
point of view?"70
69/
'Congress, House, Subcommittee on Investigations, Reorganization
Proposals for The joint Chiefs of Staff, Statement of Honorable John F. Lehman




Centralization versus decentralization was the fundamental dividing line
between Congress' aggressive drive towards reorganization and Weinberger
and Lehman's opposition. The management philosophy of Secretary of
Defense Weinberger was characterized as a decentralized approach. He gave
Service Secretaries full authority to carry out policy without micromanagement
or meddling from intermediate levels.71
Traditionally, Congress has preferred decentralized rather than centralized
control in DOD. Decentralization has allowed Congress to maximize leverage
in directing the allocation of resources and determine the outcome of policy
disputes.72 William Lucas and Raymond Dawson illustrate the point:
Congress has an interest in a considerable measure of service autonomy....
It is significant that, starting with the 86th Congress in 1959, successive
Congresses either enacted or considered the enactment of new
requirements for annual authorization legislation in all major areas of
weapons procurement and military research and development. The intent
of these changes was clear: to reduce the area of discretionary power of
OSD and to strengthen legislative control of programs. Congress, like the
services, appeared to feel threatened by the growing power of OSD over
all aspects of defense policy. Congress joined with the armed services in
resisting a historic redistribution of power in the Pentagon. 73
^Congress, Senate, Senate Armed Service Committee, Organization
Structure and Procedures of the DOD, Statement of Secretary John Lehman,
Secretary Of The Navy, 98-1, S201-26.1, 2 November 1983: 221.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff
Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee," 99th Congress, 586-588.
73William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, The Organizational Politics
of Defense, (International Studies Association, 1974), 120.
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The question is then raised, Why did Congress pursue reorganization that
sought to centralize DOD, when it defied their very own divide and conquer
strategy?
Part of the answer came in a 645 page SASC Staff Report directed by
James R. Locher III. The Senate study urged Pentagon reorganization. It
diagnosed the key problems of concern to Congress. The report identified that
parochial viewpoints of the Services impeded the military's preparation for war
and the quality of its advice to civilian leaders. It blamed poor interservice
coordination for the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 and
the shortcomings in the 1983 invasion of Grenada.74 In addition, the terrorist
bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon that resulted in 241 deaths
produced severe criticism of Pentagon organization.
The remaining part of the answer is found in an assessment by Pat
Towell. Towell reports that support for reorganization stemmed from
congressional "unhappiness rooted in the sheer size of Reagan's defense
budgets and the concomitant efforts to slash popular domestic programs."75
There was also widespread congressional belief that Weinberger and Reagan
had very little grasp on many defense issues. Another factor was Weinberger's
limited political support due to widely publicized cases of costly weapon
74
U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Reorganization: The Need For Change .
75Pat Towell, "Senate Backs Major Changes In Organization Of Pentagon,"
Congressional Quarterly, (May 10, 1986), 1031.
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systems that failed critical tests and miscellaneous items such as toilet seats
costing $640 dollars. According to Towell, "Weinberger's influence on Capitol
Hill had reached such a low ebb that his opposition to certain proposals may
have increased the margin of congressional support for change."76
With the release of the SASC Staff Report and an intense publicity
campaign by Goldwater and Nunn, Pentagon opposition softened. Weinberger,
in a December 2nd letter to SASC Chairman Goldwater, agreed in general
terms to support various measures in the defense reorganization bill. As
Representative Bill Nichols D-Alabama, indicated: "The Secretary saw the
handwriting on the wall."77
In an effort to forestall the growing criticism of DOD, President Reagan
in June 1985 appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
to examine progress already made in improving the management, organization,
and decision-making procedures of DOD and propose further changes if
needed. He assigned David Packard, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, to
head the commission. The Packard Commission proved to be the final boost
for proponents of reorganization. The Commission spelled out criticism of the
76Pat Towell, "Parochial Interests at Issue: House Approves Bill to Boost
Role of Joint Chiefs Chairman," Congressional Quarterly, (November 23, 1985),
2437.
77
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Reform," Congressional Quarterly, (December 7, 1985), 2570.
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current DOD policy, however, in less harsh terms than congressional critics.
The Commission stated:
There is a need for more and better long-range planning to bring together
the nation's security objectives, the forces needed to achieve them, and the
resources available to support those forces. It is critically important that
this relationship be clearly established through a national military
strategy. 78
In 1986, SASC began hearings on the basis of its own staff report, the
Packard Commission and an independent review entitled, Toward a more
Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project.
Although there were many close votes on specific issues, illustrated by 14
mark-up sessions and 80 written amendments, the Senate voted unanimously
95-0 on S 2295 (Senate's version of HR 3622). 79
On 12 September 1986, a House and Senate conference produced a
compromised version of HR 3622. The Senate approved the conference report
by voice vote September 16 and the House likewise September 17. The
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act became law on
1 October 1986.
78Packard Commission, "A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the
President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,"
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 10.
79Congress, Senate, Senator Goldwater speaking on the Department Of
Defense Reorganization Act Of 1986, 99th Congress," Congressional Record (7
May 1986), S5464.
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The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which proposed full-scale reorganization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military command system, and the structure of the
Department of Defense, had two overriding purposes. The first main objective
of the bill was to ensure that national interests, as opposed to the parochial
interests of the individual Services, received full weight in top-level
deliberations in the Defense Department. The second objective sought to
increase the role of the CINCs to ensure that they have a voice in budgetary
and policy debates.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act culminated four and a half years of
congressional determinism despite analysts like Robert J. Art, who argue that
Congress looks "mostly at the details of defense spending, but rarely at the big
picture.80 I conclude that two critical factors standout as to why Congress was
successful in the reform process: first, SASC's predilection for consensus-
building under the leadership of Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn, and
second, President Reagan's choice not to invoke his authority as commander in
chief and his formidable political assets to seriously challenge the advocates of
change. With Weinberger the strongest opponent during the reform process,
President Reagan invested no political capital in his battle against
congressional critics.
80Robert J. Art, "Congress and the Defense Budget: Enhancing Policy
Oversight," in Reorganizing America's Defense, ed. Art, Vincent Davis and
Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, DC: Pergamons-Brassey's), 405.
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IV. DEALING WITH THE GORDIAN KNOT OF REFORM
Senator Sam Nunn's July 2, 1992 floor speech entitled, The Defense
Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions,
marked the beginning of what has become the roles and missions debate of the
Post-Cold War Era. As with previous roles and missions debates, how the
Executive Branch, Congress and Services responded to the demands of change
determined any realignment, consolidation or even abolishment of service roles
and missions.
Traditionally, interservice rivalry has dominated debates involving service
roles and missions. This is true in the sense that conflict over roles and
missions is a function of fluctuating defense budgets. When resources are
plentiful, duplicative functions proliferate. In this regard, interservice conflict
is minimal because services are not pressed by encroachments of another to
charge waste or duplication. In the early 1960's, when the Air Force was faced
with losing strategic bombers to missiles and counterinsurgency (COIN) was
a growth industry, the Air Force set up a COIN activity of their own. Until this
time, COIN warfare had been an Army function only. Without Army
resistance, the Air Force was successful in its establishment of a flying role in
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COIN warfare. The Army was tolerant because its resources were not
jeopardized as the result of duplication.81
With decreasing budgets, conflict arises over requests for dollars and
subsequent debates about duplicative functions. According to Lucas and
Dawson, "In time of economic entrenchment, departments will agree that costs
need to be cut, but they are unlikely to feel the bulk of savings should be
found in their own budget."82 Conflict arises when the following questions
are asked: Who is best qualified to do what or what is most efficiently and
properly done by whom? Once a service feels threatened that it may lose
funds over a duplicative function, the service will be compelled to attack the
effectiveness of the other Services. During a time of reduced defense spending,
the fierce Navy-Air Force conflict over the B-36s and super-carriers, illustrates
the interservice conflict that ensues when two competing programs are placed
head to head.83
This chapter will examine the current roles and missions debate from
three separate perspectives. The first perspective is that of Congress. This
section will discuss the congressional response to the current debate and will
identify the specific areas that Congress has identified as having substantial






duplication. The second perspective is that of the military. This section will
focus on their response to Congress' call for a "no-holds-barred, everything-on-
the-table review of the current assignments of roles and missions among the
military Services."84 The final perspective is that of the Executive Branch.
This section discusses the Clinton administration's response to the current roles
and missions debate.
A. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Senator Nunn's actions on the Senate floor in July of 92, was a mandate
for interservice debate over roles and missions. In Nunn's concluding remarks
he indicated:
I hope that we can initiate a process to help stimulate the kind of far-
reaching review that our times demand. As I mentioned earlier, my
intention is to stimulate and facilitate General Powell's and the
Department's efforts in this difficult task. It is far better for the
Department to accomplish this review. ... I welcome ideas and debate to
help produce the constructive and bipartisan reform that was the hallmark
of Goldwater-Nichols. 85
The essence of Nunn's mandate is his fear that a failure to eliminate
needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services will lead to a
"diminished" military capability.86 Nunn argued that Congress and DOD
must take advantage of the historic events that have brought about the post-






Cold War environment. Nunn stressed that changing security requirements,
technological opportunities and budget imperatives, have created the need for
change.
In his speech, Nunn, lauded the Air Force, in contrast to the other
Services, for doing a better job in its reorganization of management and
administrative structures. Nunn indicates the Army and Navy are doing a good
job with downsizing their respective forces, but are way behind the Air Force
in this regard. Nunn's real concern, however, is not how fast the Services are
downsizing, but how they are downsizing. He stated, ". . . There are virtually
no major changes that cross service lines. For all practical purposes, each
service is designing its own smaller future."87 Nunn's concern is best
illustrated by Admiral Crowe, who explained:
At every point in our history as a country, when we have faced the end
of a period of military crisis and the start of an era of relative peace, we
deal with our defense policy in a two-step process. The first step is to cut
the defense budget. And when we do that we usually get a smaller
version of what we currently have. The second step is to shape a new
force in light of the changed circumstances. We have always tended to do
the first step and failed to follow through with the second. This is why
Admirals and Generals are usually prepared to fight theTast war. It isn't
their fault, because the Defense Department only gives them a smaller
version of what they had in the last war.88
The message Nunn is conveying, by charging that the Services are
designing their own smaller future irrespective of redundancy and duplication
87
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88Crow cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 6.
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across service lines, coupled with his mandate for an interservice debate over
roles and missions, takes on several meanings. First, Congress will not tolerate
nor allow what Admiral Crowe indicates as a smaller version of what we
currently have. A failure to reverse this trend can certainly lead to the feared
hollow force, that the U.S. has so painstakingly tried to avoid, yet so painfully
experienced. Second, Congress has demanded that the Services under the
leadership of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff produce the needed
changes that will eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within service roles
and missions. Whether consolidation, realignment or abolishment, Nunn
indicates that it is far better for DOD to accomplish such tasks.
Finally, Nunn's speech sends an important, but obscure message for DOD
and the Executive Branch. Congress' role in defense policymaking should not
be misunderstood. Blechman articulates Nunn's message with his view that the
days when Congress played the role "of a relatively minor actor, frequently
outspoken but only sporadically consulted, rarely involved in actual decision
making and never in policy execution" is over.89 The congressional activism
that brought Goldwater-Nichols (GNA) to fruition is an example of the role
Congress will take in future defense policymaking. This assessment raises the
question, If DOD balks at eliminating duplication and inefficiencies in its roles
"Barry M. Blechman, "The New Congressional Role in Arms Control," in
A Question Of Balance: The President, The Congress, and Foreign Policy, ed.
Thomas E. Mann (The Brookings Institution, 1990), 109-110.
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and missions, how capable will Congress be in handling defense policy
formulation and implementation? Unlike GNA, roles and missions
reorganization is tied to defense spending programs that provide jobs for
constituents, and therefore has re-election incentives. Chapter V will further
discuss the implications that Congress might experience in their quest for
defense restructuring.
Senator Nunn does provide a non-prescriptive framework for reform. He
describes nineteen areas that contain substantial duplication and that have the
potential for streamlining. It is not the goal of this thesis to get into the
specifics of each category, nor make recommendations for additions or
deletions. The following list is provided to illustrate the enormous impact,
controversy, and sensitivity that exist within a roles and missions debate.
• projection of air power
• land-based vs. sea-based power projection
• duplicative multirole fighter capability
• duplication between Marine Corps and Navy
• parallel electronic jammer aircraft fleets
• contingency or expeditionary ground forces, duplicative infantry divisions
• Army tank and MLRS battalions for Marine Corps
• theater air defenses
• space operations






consolidate Medical Corps, Chaplains Corps and Legal Departments
logistics and support activities
administrative and management headquarters
unified combatant command headquarters
National Guard and Reserve component forces
This list also serves as an explanation as to why roles and missions have gone
unchanged since the Key West Agreement. Congress has a significant battle
if they are to achieve the elimination of duplication and inefficiencies that have
been labeled a problem "too hard" to solve?90
Senator Nunn hasn't been the lone Congressman in the pursuit to
eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within the Services. Nunn's efforts
have been endorsed by Senator John Warner R-Virginia. Warner, the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) ranking republican, supports the initiative
to reorganize roles and missions and is very direct in how it will be carried out.
He states:
It is exceedingly difficult, no matter how strong a secretary of defense
may be or a chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, for them to put the final
90General David Jones cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 3.
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framework on an armed force which must then go forward for a number
of years in that configuration, ... I predict that the end result will be one
that is primarily determined by the Congress.91
House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Rep Ronald Dellums (D-
California), has been outspoken as well. In regards to Clinton's initial military
spending plan of 263 billion, Dellums accused Les Aspin of presenting a
budget that was too close to one he had inherited from former Secretary Of
Defense, Dick Cheney. Dellums fundamental argument is that there is a
significant cost in delaying year after year the inevitable adjustment to the
post-Cold War era.92
Critics of major reorganization include Senator John McCain, R-Arizona.
Although McCain supported a roles and missions review by Collin Powell, he
stated, "it would be a mistake to expect it to endorse wholesale changes. . . . the
United States should avoid mistakes made by the British."93 What McCain
was referring to was the Falkland Islands war in 1982, whereby British forces
suffered from previous military reductions.
In anticipation of Chairman Powell's roles and missions report, Congress
put the pressure on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Colin
Powell to produce revolutionary changes that recommended eliminating costly
91Rick Maze, "Role review holds up weapons," Army Times, 24 August 1992:
21.
92Eric Schmitt, Lawmakers Are Impatient to Start Pentagon Cuts," The New
York Times, 31 March 1993: A8.
93John McCain cited in Maze, "Role review," 21.
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duplication. Closely paralleled to the GNA publicity campaign initiated by
Nunn and Goldwater over unification, a similar campaign over duplication and
inefficiencies of service roles and missions has been waged. Since Nunn's July
2nd floor speech, articles have proliferated in newspapers, magazines and
professional journals, debating the issues of duplication and redundancy
within the military Services. As with GNA, it appears members of Congress
have begun to drum up support, in the early stages, for what they hope will
ultimately lead to significant service streamlining. Congress' position is clear,
reduce military spending that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies and still
maintain a strong defense. However, this is easier said than done. For every
argument that seeks an end to costly duplication and redundancy, there is a
rational argument against. The Services have provided such arguments.
B. DOD RESPONSE
In an early response to the call for dramatic military reorganization,
Colonel William Smullen (spokesperson for CJCS Powell), indicated that any
recommendations made in the roles and missions report would not call for
radically reshaping the four Services, but would make recommendations to
make the Services more efficient. Smullen noted, "In some instances, changes
that the report will propose 'will be viewed by some inside the services as
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revolutionary/. . . But to those outside the services, 'they will seem less
dramatic/"94
Chairman Powell, during a 28 July SASC hearing, responded to repeated
criticisms as to why land and sea services required their own air forces. Powell
stated:
We get beaten up in the press for having four air forces, but I say thank
God Congress in its wisdom gave us four air forces. The question isn't
how to get rid of [some of the air forces, but how to] make them more
complimentary and not redundant.95
Powell went on to testify chat duplication has enabled the Services to provide
the nation much greater military capability. Many strategists concur with
Powell's philosophy in this regard. Mackubin Thomas Owens offers a very
stimulating analysis of Senator Nunn's quest for maximum efficiency:
Where the accountant (read Congress) seeks efficiency, the advocate of a
strategic capabilities approach to roles and functions (the "Strategist")
seeks "military effectiveness;" ensuring that the nation has the proper
tools to defend its interests, and to win wars if they come. Where the
accountant sees duplication, the strategist sees redundancy, the military
obligation to have enough means to ensure victory, and complimentary,
a broad range of unique capabilities that can be brought to bear as
required by the situation. Where the accountant sees wasteful duplication
between naval aviation and landbased aviation and between the Army
and Marines, the military planner sees an array of tools that allows him
to fulfill different operational needs and meet different strategic
requirements.96
94William Smullen cited in William Mathews, "On a role: Lawmakers rev
up to restructure the military," Army Times, 10 August 1992: 28.
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Owens does not discard the fact that efficiency has a place in military affairs
and that DOD has room for cutting costs. His concern is if changes are made,
they be made in light of strategic requirements vice efficiency. An illustration
of stressing efficiency over strategic requirements occurred in the 1960's by
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As Owens argued, McNamara
confused "accounting with strategy" and attempted to force the same airframe
on the Navy and Air Force that resulted in the TFX controversy.97
Owens's analysis is important because it represents the current philosophy
of Chairman Powell and the Services. It also provides rationale as to why the
military Services are unable to provide revolutionary changes in their roles,
missions and functions. Throughout Chairman Powell's February 1993 report
entitled, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions,
and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," references are made
supporting this philosophy. For example, Powell, on page ix of the executive
summary, illustrates the advantages in having complementary capabilities
among the services. He indicates that flexibility at the national command level
provides additional options to senior decision-makers in a crisis. In addition,
theater CINCs "can more effectively tailor a military response to any
contingency, regardless of location."98 A second example can be found on
97
Ibid.
"Colin L. Powell, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the
Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States,"
52
page 1-12. Powell states, "We cannot preserve our military strength if we place
perceived economy ahead of proven effectiveness, or if we place one Service
or component ahead of the others."99 There are other examples, but the point
is made - that the Services under the current leadership of Chairman Powell
will be unable to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies, less recommend, as
envisioned by members of Congress.
Chairman Powell's report does address what it considers significant
change that has taken place over the past three years and proposes some
significant additional changes in Chapter III. According to Powell, the creation
of United States Strategic Command (StratCom) that combined all strategic
bombers, missiles and submarines under one command, represent "the most




° Additional changes have been: the elimination of nuclear
functions for the Army and Marine Corps; elimination of chemical weapons use
with the signing of the Chemical Weapons convention in Paris on 13 January
1993; and dramatic infrastructure changes that have seen a drawdown to Base
Force levels and below.101







As for proposals for significant change, Powell recommended the creation
of a new CINC for U.S. based forces, and further review of possible
consolidation of U.S. Space Command with StratCom. There are many other
specific recommendations within the 53 page Powell report that offer
improvements needed to maintain maximum effectiveness of the Services.
Powell's overall objective for the report was to ensure the National
Military Strategy of the United States was effectively aligned with force
structure. Recommendations made affecting the roles, missions and functions
of the Services were made with the objective to either maintain and if possible
enhance the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in light of force reductions
and reduced funding.
Powell's report has been assessed as falling short in the fundamental
restructuring of military roles and missions as called for by Senator Nunn and
others. Michael Gordon of the New York Times states, "it is more noteworthy
for its objection to the view that Washington should eliminate duplication by
realigning the missions of the three military Services."102 Powell himself has
acknowledged that his recommendations have fallen short of those set by
President Clinton during his election campaign. 103 Powell justified the way
102Michael Gordon, "Report by Powell Challenges Calls To Revise Military,"
The New York Times, 31 December 1992: Al.
103Clinton's goals mirrored those of Senator Nunn. John Lancaster, "Military
Reshaping Plan Is Short of Clinton Goals," The Washington Post, 13 February
1993: A4.
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his report reads, explaining that it was prepared during the Bush
administration. 104
Although Powell has indicated the report is solely his and not a consensus
report, much of the work was produced by the Pentagon's Joint Staff under
Powell's direct supervision.105 In addition, Powell's report contained the
input of CINCs and other senior military officers. This has important
implications in that Powell's report represents what the Services see as their
vision of the future. If this is correct, it suggest a greater institutional barrier
for Congress and the Clinton administration in their quest to cut military
spending. Had Chairman Powell produced a report that met the expectations
of Congress and the Clinton administration, it's very likely an inter-service
brawl would have ensued. The question is then raised, Is the CJCS capable of
producing such a report? After all, GNA strengthened the stature and authority
of the Chairman for the very purpose of providing professional military advice
that rises above the narrower interests of the individual Services.
According to General Lee Butler, CinCStratCom, the answer is yes. Butler
indicated that a roles and missions report that provides revolutionary changes
is possible. However, it would require a Chairman who possesses a strong
vision. In addition, fundamental changes to the National Military Strategy
104
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28 January 1992: Al.
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would be necessary. Butler stressed that how we define such missions as
Forward Presence and Power Projection will have to be re-defined. Butler's
message was clear: if the Services are to rise above Cold War thinking and
survive 200 billion dollar or less defense budgets, strong visionary leadership
must emerge.106
C EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE
During President Clinton's campaign for the presidency, he vowed a
rearrangement of service roles and missions. Clinton stated that as president
he would call a meeting similar to the 1948 Key West conference. Clinton's
goal is to have the service chiefs "hammer out a new understanding about
consolidating and coordinating military roles and missions in the 1990s and
beyond."107
The Clinton administration's philosophy concerning military policy is
closely related to that of Congress. Prior to taking office, Clinton denounced
the Base Force plan as Cold War thinking. He called it "a scaled-down version
of the Cold War military designed for warfare in Europe, ill-equipped to react
fast enough or move far enough in an era when sudden regional wars are




considered the most likely contingencies."108 President Clinton is in total
agreement with Senator Nunn's assessment that it is time to reevaluate the
basic organization of our Armed Forces. Clinton indicated:
We have four separate air forces - one each for the Marines, Army, Navy
and Air Force. Both the Army and Marines have light infantry divisions.
The Navy and Air Force have separately developed, but similar, fighter
aircraft and tactical missiles.109
Clinton added that we can reduce redundancies while respectir,'* each Service's
unique capabilities, and save billions of dollars.110
Although Clinton has expressed to resolve the issues surrounding roles
and missions, the question remains as to whether he is prepared to expend the
required political capital if defense reforms are to be implemented successfully.
Critics might argue that Clinton has already used-up valuable capital over gays
in the military, and his failed economic stimulus package. The importance of
political capital was illustrated by Presdident Reagan when he chose not to
provide defense secretary Casper Weinberger with much needed political
capital in his fight against the Goldwater - Nichols legislation. The result was
Weinberger's failure and eventual retreat against GNA legislation.
James Blackwell and Barry Blechman illustrate why bringing reform to the







certain bureaucratic organizations and other institutions with self-interest.
Many of these affected organizations have close allies in Congress, which
makes passing reform legislation very difficult. 111
According to Blackwell and Blechman, Clinton's success at realigning
military roles and missions will certainly depend upon his Secretary of
Defense, Les Aspin. Blackwell and Blechman state, "The most important
person in consummating the reform of the defense establishment is the
secretary of defense. . . ." U2 Aspin, while serving as Chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, made his mark as a reformer by presenting four
alternative force structures. "Option C" became the most widely publicized of
the four. Aspin indicated that "Option C" was his preferred option, and that
it served to illustrate that deeper reductions beyond the Bush administration's
Base Force were needed.113
Aspin will definitely pursue some level of Pentagon reform when he
completes a "comprehensive 'bottom-up' review this summer."114 In response
to Powell's report, Aspin has directed a second roles, missions and functions
inJames A. Blackwell Jr., and Barry M. Blechman, Making Defense Reform
work (Brassey's (US), INC., Washington, New York, 1990), 267.
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report to be completed by May of 1993. Vital to this subsequent report, the
Joint Staff is currently working with the Clinton administration on a new
National Security Strategy.115 Clinton's National Security Strategy will
provide the broad policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of the roles,
missions, and functions of the Armed Forces. If the Services are forced into a
fight for their survival, the summer of 1993 may truly turn out to be one hot
summer.
In conclusion, this chapter sought to illustrate the views of Congress,
Services and Executive Branch in thier evaluation of eliminating duplication
and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. The intent of Senator
Nunn's floor speech is to create debate over roles and missions and provide
examples where there appears to be substantial duplication and the opportunity
for streamlining. Nunn's fear and the fear of other congressional members, is
that if needless duplication and inefficiencies are not eliminated during
declining defense budgets, the result will lead to a diminished military
capability or hollow force. The Services on the other hand argue that
duplication has enabled the nation much greater military capability. Chairman
Powell and the Services stand behind the changes that have already taken
place. They argue that the realignment of our nuclear triad under one
command represents the most dramatic change in the assignment of roles and
mCaptain Ronald D. Gumbert, USN, Assistant Deputy Director for Strategic
Plans & Policy, The Joint Staff, interview by Author, 4 March 1993.
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missions since 1947. The Services contend the recommendations made in
Powell's roles and missions report fully support the strategic direction
promulgated by the National Security and Military Strategies of the United
States. The Executive Branch has responded to the link between National
strategy and roles and missions, and has begun re-writing current U.S.
strategies. A subsequent roles and missions report has been directed to be
completed by late summer 1993. President Clinton's response to the roles and
missions debate has mirrored that of Senator Nunn. The question that faces
Clinton is will he be capable of expending the necessary political capital
required to successfully implement significant defense reform.
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V. DEFENSE POLICYMAKING: LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE
In a letter to Senator Nunn SASC Chairman, Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin indicated that "the proper assignment of roles, missions, and functions
to the military Services is vital to ensuring that our forces are the most effective
possible at any given level of resources."116 It is for this reason that Aspin
asserts that service roles, missions and functions will be an integral part of his
comprehensive "bottom-up" review due this summer. Aspin identifies four
considerations that OSD and the Joint Staff is to draw upon during their
review and recommendations on service roles and missions:
• How do the new post-Cold War dangers impact upon the assignment of
Service roles and functions? Will the Services need to assume new
responsibilities to meet these dangers?
• Do technological challenges and opportunities require changes in the
assignment of Service roles and functions?
• Will proposed changes produce significant cost savings?
• Are proposed changes realistically achievable in_ light of existing
organizational arrangements, sunk costs, and political circumstances?117
mLes Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman Senate
Armed Services Committee, Letter accompanying Joint Chiefs of Staff's Report
on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States.





While all of Aspin's questions are relevant in the review of roles and
missions, it is his last category that more closely pertains to the process of
reform and will provide the focus for this chapter. This chapter will examine
the constraints and implications of defense policymaking in regards to the
ability of Congress, Services and Executive Branch to realign, consolidate or
even abolish service roles and missions.
A. CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING
How capable will Congress be in handling defense policy formulation and
implementation? This very contentious question confronts both Senator Nunn
and his congressional backers in their quest to eliminate duplication and
inefficiencies within the Services. The question is contentious for several
reasons. First, if Congress is forced to formulate defense policy regarding
service roles and missions, it would be doing what critics argue as something
it is institutionally not well suited to do.118 Robert Art argues that it is the
task of the Executive Branch to initiate policy and that of the Congress to judge
policy. Art states,
The tasks of initiating and judging derive from the organizational
differences between bureaucracies and legislatures. Congress'
organizational structure is more nearly horizontal in nature; the executive
branch's, more nearly hierarchical. As a decentralized institution, congress
can never achieve the degree of centralized control that is requisite to
118Robert J. Art, "Congress And The Defense Budget: New Procedures And
Old Realities," in Toward A More Effective Defense, ed. Barry M. Blechman
and William J. Lynn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing
Company 1985) 151.
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develop, coordinate, and reconcile competing policy positions-all of which
are necessary steps for policy initiation. What Congress is uniquely
positioned organizationally to do is to judge.119
There are those who would argue against Art's argument claiming Goldwater-
Nichols legislation as an example of Congress' ability to formulate defense
policy. This counter may appear sound. However, there is a significant
difference between the type of legislation achieved in the Goldwater-Nichols
Act (GNA), and the type of legislation associated with reorganizing service
roles and missions.
This leads us to a second point of contention: the impact upon the budget.
Where GNA was structure and authority, roles and missions involves major
force programs and specific weapon systems. When Senator Nunn asks the
question "why do we need four air forces," he is hitting the nerve belonging
to many congressional members that senses danger when defense-related jobs
are threatened.
A third point of contention is thus, constituent-oriented concerns.
Formulating defense policy that seeks to realign, consolidate or abolish service
roles and missions may prove too difficult for legislators who are less
concerned with formulating policy and more concerned with satisfying narrow




Congress are motivated by the desire to provide "pork" for their constituents
and tend to ignore the policy aspect of issues.120
Not all political analysts agree with the constraints against Congress in the
realm of policy formulation. James Lindsay recognizes several incentives that
exist for congressional members to take on policy issues. The first is
parochialism. Congressional members will turn to policy arguments to help
win broader support in attacking other rival initiatives and for protecting ones
own favored program. A second incentive to tackle policy issues is ambition.
Policy issues can make congressional members appear more 'statesmanlike' and
thereby helping the member to get re-elected or to gain power within Congress.
Lindsay's third incentive is duty. Congressional members often times consider
policy issues as part of their job.121
The implications of the constraints illustrated seem to suggest that
Congress should stay-out of future defense policy formulation. On the other
hand, Lindsay's incentives to tackle policy coupled with congressional activism
displayed during the 1980's and early 90's suggest that Congress may be
capable of handling post-Cold War defense policy. This controversy takes us
u0Paul Stockton, "The Congressional Response," in Reconstituting National
Defense: The New National Security Strategy, Naval Postgraduate School
Document NPS-NS-91-012, 30 September 1991, p.88.
121Stockton, Policymaking For The Post-Cold War Era, 3.
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back to our original question, how capable will Congress be in handling
defense policy formulation and implementation?
In the book Congress and Nuclear Weapons, James Lindsay argues that
congressional decisionmaking can be explained by viewing the process through
three "conceptual lenses": deferential, parochial, and policy. The deferential
lens predicts that members of congress will defer to the President on weapons
acquisition issues. The parochial lens asserts that members evaluate weapons
systems based on what is good for their constituents and pay little attention to
what is good for the national interest. The policy lens contends that members
do care about the issues surrounding weapons programs and are genuinely
concerned about how weapon systems protect the national interests.122
Although Lindsay's work primarily focuses on nuclear weapons programs,
he does apply the "conceptual lenses" approach to conventional weapons and
military bases. I contend the debate over roles, missions and functions of the
Armed Forces of the United States currently can be examined through the
policy lens. However, I argue that once Defense Secretary Les Aspin completes
his "bottom-up" review, and yields detailed guidance for reshaping America's
defense forces, the debate can better be examined through the parochial lens.
The debate over roles and missions closely resembles the debate which took
place over base closures in the late 1980s and present. Lindsay argues, ". . .the
mJames Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins, 1991) 123.
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parochial lens appears to best explain how Congress handles DOD's requests
on military bases."123 In regards to the service roles and missions debate,
Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies can best be
explained through the policy lens. However, when the rubber meets the road,
Congress' capability in handling defense policy is best examined through the
parochial lens.
1. THE POLICY LENS
According to Lindsay, "People run for Congress because they want
to shape public policy and further what they see as the common good."124
However, political analyst often argue that policy matters give-way to reelection
concerns. Lindsay recognizes that reelection is a necessary goal if legislators
are to pursue their policy objectives. But within the policy lens, Lindsay
argues, "electorial incentives do not simply constrain legislative behavior; they
also encourage members to address policy issues."125 Addressing policy
issues appears responsible and "statesmanlike" to constituents and in turn










In addition, addressing defense policy may also allow congressional
members to build a reputation as a "player" in Congress. Lindsay illustrates:
Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), for example, used his expertise on defense
matters to become a major figure in the Senate. Becoming a player in
Congress offers several benefits. A legislative player by definition
exercises more influence within Congress, influence that can be used to
benefit constituents. Establishing a reputation as a player attracts the
attention of interest gr.;ups that can provide the contributions in cash and
kind needed to run a congressional reelection campaign. And being
recognized as a congressional powerbroker helps gain attention back
home, thereby providing free advertising for the next campaign.127
It is through this type of conceptual lens that explains why Senator Nunn and
his congressional supporters have initiated a debate over service roles and
missions. The substantive issues surrounding roles and missions has provided
an excellent stage to appear "statesmanlike" and responsible. Anticipating the
absence of any significant change in General Powell's February roles and
missions report, Senator Nunn saw the opportunity to take centerstage on such
a controversial policy issue.
Senator Nunn's fear that a failure to eliminate needless duplication and
inefficiencies will lead to a diminished military capability is no doubt sincere.
In the absence of appropriate policy guidance from the Executive Branch,
Senator Nunn and supporters will attempt to formulate their own defense
policy. When recommendations are made as to where cuts will come from,




reorganization in their own districts and challenge recommendations that hit
the hardest. It is at this point when the roles and missions debate will begin
to closely resemble the base closure debates. From this view, the parochial lens
appears to best explain how Congress might handle the roles and missions
debate.
2. THE PAROCHIAL LENS
According to Lindsay ". . . while individual legislators often act
parochial, Congress as an institution usually does not."128 The roles and
missions debate will be one of the rare instances in which Congress, as an
institution, will act parochially. Unlike most weapons systems and defense
programs, which affect only certain areas of the country, the roles and missions
issue affects a much broader spectrum.
Eliminating duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and
missions to the level that has been called for by Senator Nunn would impact
practically every spending category within DOD. Redefining the structure and
composition of U.S. forces affects everything from highly contested base
closing and cutting reserves to individual service programs. In order to fulfil
policy initiatives that redefine force structure, spending levels of budget line




duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions a problem "too
hard" to solve.129
Driven by "pork instincts/' members of Congress will reject President
Clinton's proposals in their attempt to protect constituent benefits. House
Armed Services Committee Chairman, Rep. Ronald Dellums D-CA., stated in
a 23 May 1993 NBC news broadcast that he would utilize every bit of power
within his chairmanship to protect his San Francisco Bay area constituents from
military cuts. This is contradictory to the 31 March 1993 New York Times
article that was presented in Chapter IV, whereby Dellums accused Aspin of
presenting a budget reminiscent of the Cold War era. In addition, Dellums
complained about the significant costs in delaying inevitable adjustments to a
post-Cold War military. This contradiction serves to illustrate how parochial
behavior of Congressional members will dominate their decisionmaking as
defense spending cuts take shape.
Congress, as viewed through the parochial lens, will be unable to
formulate and implement appropriate defense reorganization that eliminates
duplication and inefficiencies within service roles and missions. This is not
to say Congress has no role in implementing defense policy. Congress through
its appropriations process has a "de facto" role in implementing broad policy
shifts by altering defense budget line items and making other detailed
U9General David Jones cited in Nunn, Floor Speech, 3.
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legislative changes."130 Congress does cut defense programs and they have
been doing so since 1985. However, the programs cut have been weapons
programs, and jobs for these programs are typically concentrated in a very
limited number of congressional districts. In this regard, Paul Stockton states,
"... legislators have lacked a direct parochial interest in specific funding
disputes."131 Thus, past defense cuts are not representative of Congress'
ability to formulate and implement defense policy associated with roles and
missions. As previously stated, roles and missions affect a much broader
spectrum than do most weapon systems and defense programs. Base closures
and Reserve issues more closely resemble the hard choices that lay ahead for
post-Cold War defense policy.
The significant relationship between base closures and Reserve issues
with defense policymaking is the by-product of the congressional
decisionmaking that results. Parochialism does not prevent bases from being
closed or Reserves from being cut, on the contrary bases are being closed and
Reserve levels are coming down. However, if Congress is forced into defense
policy formulation regarding service roles and missions the impact will most
likely result in a compromise of smaller forces, instead of the hard choices of
consolidating or abolishing roles and missions. If Congress is to bring about




significant change in the Service's roles and missions, Congress will need to
take a similar approach, as it did with the base closure commission. The
impact of reorganizing service roles and missions that truly eliminate the
duplication and inefficiencies has too great of an impact upon congressional
members reelection incentives and constituent benefits. Morris Fiorina
illustrates the result when Congress avoids the substance of policy issues:
"Public policy emerges from the system almost as an afterthought. The shape
of policy is a by-product of the way the system operates, rather than a
consciously directed effort to deal with social and economic problems."132
The by-product in the case of defense reorganization will be a smaller version
of the force we currently have. The result will lead to a diminished military
capability or hollow force.
B. THE SERVICES
The heart of the roles and missions debate is the concern over duplication
and inefficiencies that exist within the military. The least likely group capable
of proposing reform that would eliminate or reduce these concerns is the
Services themselves. The case was made in Chapter IV when General Powell
testified that duplication has enabled the Services to provide the nation much
greater military capability. In addition, what Powell and the Services see as
significant change (read force structure) and what Congress sees as significant
132Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, 13.
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change (read budget) are very different. These are not the only reasons the
Services are incapable of reorganizing themselves. Institutional barriers, sunk
costs and the powerful political force of uncertainty and threat are factors as
well. A brief look at each will illustrate why the Services are the least capable
in reforming themselves.
1. Institutional Barriers
Carl Builder teaches us that institutions such as the Navy, Air Force
and Army, "while composed of many, ever-changing individuals, have distinct
and enduring personalities of their own that govern much of their
behavior."133 For example, the Navy according to Builder is marked by two
personalities, its independence and stature.
The Department of the Navy ... is the most strategically independent of
the services-it has its own army, navy and air force. It is least dependent
on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control
over all the assets, and be left alone.134
It should be no surprise the Navy opposed not only GNA, but practically every
legislation that sought to reorganize U.S defense forces since the Act of 1798
establishing the Department of the Navy. According to Builder, "the unique
service identities . . . are likely to persist for a very long time."135
133Carl H. Builder, The Masks Of War, 3.




Organizational theory tells us that military organizations like all large
organizations are noted for their resistance to change. A popular military
maxim taken out of the Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations illustrates
this point: "Any change, even for the better, is to be deprecated."136
According to Liddell Hart, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into
the military mind is to get an old one out."137
In a 16 December 1982 SASC Hearing, General David Jones provided a
very descriptive illustration of the U.S. military establishments resistance to
change.
By their very nature, large organizations have a built-in resistance to
change. As the largest organization in the free world, our defense
establishment -the Department of Defense -has most of the problems of
a large corporation but lacks an easily calculated "bottom line" to force
needed change. At the core are the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps: institutions that find it difficult to adapt to changing conditions
because of understandable attachments to the past. The very foundation
of each service rests on imbuing its members with pride in its missions,
its doctrine and its customs and discipline-all of which are steeped in
traditions. While these deepseated service distinctions are important in
fostering a fighting spirit, cultivating them engenders tendencies to look
inward and to insulate the institutions against outside challenges. The
history of our services includes striking examples of ideas and inventions
whose time had come, but which were resisted because they did not fit
into existing service concepts. The Navy kept building sailing ships long
after the advent of steam power. Machine guns and tanks were developed
in the United States, but our Army rejected them until long after they
were accepted in Europe. The horse cavalry survived essentially
unchanged right up until World War II despite evidence that its utility
was greatly diminished decades earlier. Even Army Air Corps officers




were required to wear spurs until the late 1930's. But the armed services
are only part of the problem. The Defense Department has evolved into
a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies-services, agencies, staffs, boards
and committees-which embrace the past and adapt new technology to fit
traditional missions and methods. There is no doubt that the cavalry
leaders would have quickly adopted a horse which went farther and faster
-a high-technology stallion. The result of this rigidity has been an ever-
widening gap between the need to adapt to changing conditions and our
ability to do so.138
Although GNA has empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
provide recommendations for change, free of service influence and at least once
every three years; General Powell's current report illustrates that organizational
and procedural deficiencies still exist. Critics claim Powell's report offers little
more than defending the status quo.
2. Sunk Costs
William Lucas and Raymond Dawson provide excellent analysis as
to why consolidating or eliminating duplicative activities has been difficult for
the DOD. They argue that using the budget as an instrument of control is
ineffective because, "by the time an activity is recognized as duplicative, it may
be too late. . . . "Sunk costs" and organizational barriers to transferring activities
often make it simpler to accept the duplication."139
Lucas and Dawson indicate that duplication is the result of the absence
of jurisdictional boundaries, or boundaries made obsolete or ambiguous by
138
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advancing social or technological change. The Services have recognized the
incentive to establish itself in a field prior to any jurisdictional lines being
drawn. Once a function or mission becomes of greater importance, history has
shown (e.g., IRBM competition and Air Defense controversy) that early
investment weighs heavily in future organizational bargaining. 140
When conflict does arise over jurisdiction, it has usually centered around
the transfer of jurisdictions alone. Establishing a program, buying the material,
and training the personnel is often a major investment. Lucas and Dawson
contend that when faced with prospect of having to close one program and
expand the same activity in another department, those faced with the decision
are likely to keep the status quo. According to Lucas and Dawson, ". . . major
investment in training and experience is not transferable when the personnel
are not; the costs of moving a jurisdiction from one military service to another
therefore, become virtually prohibitive."141 Lucas and Dawson conclude:
Even when an iron-clad case can be made for the transfer and
consolidation of an activity, it is often not worth the political costs. The
distinctive nature of the military services thus helps to preclude simple
reallocation of established jurisdictions. Duplication, once established and







Lucas and Dawson offer very detailed examples in the IRBM competition
and air defense controversy. These two examples serve to illustrate how "sunk
costs" have made eliminating duplicative efforts extremely difficult for
decision-makers. In the case of the air defense controversy over the Hercules
and Bomarc missiles, OSD watched the two programs grow and was unable to
choose between the two. The matter became so contentious that in 1959
Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, admitted to SASC that he was incapable
of choosing between the two air defense missiles. He stated, "it would not
bother me if you held our feet in the fire and forced us in connection with this
budget."143 In result, SASC cut the Nike Hercules program, however, HASC
did the opposite and chose to cut the Bomarc program. This split forced OSD
to bring forward a "Master Plan" for air defense. Predictably OSD's plan
called for reduced programs in both missiles. In the end, both Hercules and
Bomarc survived as equivalents.144
To complicate matters worse, the Army and the Air Force in both cases
argued that their programs were not merely duplicative, but added an
important and different capability. In addition, the Services were supported by
constituencies outside DOD. Foremost being Congress. In the case of the
IRBM competition, many proponents were ardent partisans of different




systems. For example, "One official remarked that if the OSD cancelled the
Thor, 'a Congressional delegation from California would be down our necks
[Douglas Aircraft was a prime contractor] while a cancellation of Jupiter would
have the Alabama and Michigan delegations up in arms [Chrysler was to
produce Jupiter]'."145
The impact of "sunk costs" determining the fate of a particular mission or
function can readily be seen in General Powell's current roles and missions
report. The concept of consolidating and moving Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, Florida to Fort Rucker,
Alabama, is being considered based on its "sunk costs". The question of
consolidating C-130 operations, management, and support was recommended
against based on decreased operational effectiveness and "sunk costs". Other
examples include: consolidating Construction Engineers; Should Navy EP-3E
and Air Force RC-135 Electronic Surveillance Aircraft both be retained? Should
the Army provide Tanks and MLRS to the Marine Corps?146
3. Uncertainty and Threat
DOD is also found at a disadvantage in reducing duplication because
of uncertainty and threat. Lucas and Dawson argue that together, they become
a powerful political force supporting duplication. They define uncertainty as
145
Ibid., 49.
146Colin Powell, Report on Roles, xxii-xxx.
77
"the doubt that a given set of organizational programs will achieve a
corresponding set of organizational goals. Threat is defined as "an inherent
environmental condition: the price or the penalty which organization and the
constituencies it seems will have to pay in the event that its efforts and
programs should fail to achieve those goals."147
Lucas and Dawson illustrate the dynamics of organizational behavior
regarding uncertainty and threat in the super-carrier and B-36 bomber conflict.
In 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson pressed for budget reductions by
seeking a judgement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the continued
construction of a super, flush-deck carrier for the Navy. With the support a
split vote (the Chief of Naval Operations in lone dissent), Johnson cancelled
the prototype aircraft carrier, which was the Navy's claim to a major role in
atomic warfare. Johnson's goal was to suppress the Navy's act of duplication.
The Navy responded by initiating "OP 23", which sought to manipulate
uncertainty regarding strategic bombing as a viable national strategy. However,
the writing was on the wall suggesting that the post-war Congress was only
going to support a military force that contained aviation forces with nuclear
capabilities.148
147Lucas and Dawson, 55.
I48lbid., 56.
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The essence of the Navy's revolt thus became defense of duplication. The
Navy centered their argument around a challenge to the B-36 as a weapon
sufficiently capable of delivering an atomic bomb on target. Testifying before
Congress, the Navy emphasized the capability of Soviet radar and questioned
the B-36's ability to penetrate Soviet airspace against Soviet jet fighters. In
addition, the Navy questioned the accuracy of high-altitude bombing. By
exposing the vulnerabilities of the B-36, the Navy created uncertainty as to the
ability of the Air Force to perform strategic bombing by themselves. The Navy
offering Congress insurance argued that a Navy carrier strike force had the
capability to do what the B-36 might not be able to do; deliver an atomic bomb
on target. The Navy lost their super-carrier for a short period until resources
became more plentiful, but the Navy's goal of duplicating a strategic bombing
role for Navy aviation was sanctioned.149 Lucas and Dawson conclude that
uncertainty is an incentive for duplicative efforts.150
Threat works in conjunction with uncertainty. During the Cold War era
the threat to U.S. security was perceived as being very high. With the complete
destruction of the U.S. as the consequence of war, the costs of error in a major
policy decision were profound that almost any doubt was intolerable.
149When resources did become more plentiful, the carrier the Navy did
receive was much different in design than the super-carrier USS United States.
This point is made, so as not to confuse the reader in thinking the Navy




According to Lucas and Dawson, 'The magnitude of the threat, therefore,
served to magnify the need for certainty, and the compelling drive was to be
as sure as possible about the success of the organizational goals in
defense."151 It is under these circumstances that the Services competed in
risk-reduction by advancing individual programs and "to achieve a significant
political effect by manipulating uncertainty."152 The importance of Lucas and
Dawson's threat and uncertainty lesson is its value in understanding the
current roles and missions debate, and how defense policy for the post-Cold
War environment will be played out. General Powell has already played the
threat and uncertainty card in justifying programs for his Base Force plan,
stressing that "The Cold War era has given way to a new era of uncertainty and
unrest."153
C THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
According to James Blackwell and Barry Blechman, "The most important
person in consummating the reform of the defense establishment is the
secretary of defense, . . ."154 They also conclude that "The" President must be
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reforms are to be implemented successfully."155 Based upon these two
assumptions, I argue that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin with his
congressional background has the best opportunity to formulate and implement
defense policy shaped for a post-Cold War environment.
Any reform sought by the Clinton administration that goes beyond
evolutionary changes will undoubtedly be met with substantial criticism from
bureaucratic organizations and other institutions who's self interest is adversely
affected. The challenges confronting revolutionary changes may prove to be
too big a hurdle for President Clinton to expend the required political capital
necessary to pass such reform. Aware of institutional and bureaucratic barriers,
Les Aspin will likely seek a defense policy that will reflect his congressional
experience and be a policy workable to both Services and Congress.
Aspin has already taken important steps in squelching future battles with
Congress. He has imported over a dozen House staff members as top aides,
ordered overhaul of the foreign and domestic policy arms to focus on specific
issues the way congressional subcommittees do, and raised the sensitivity level
of pentagon planners to budget cuts that Congress might oppose. 156
Critical to any reform effort will be President Clinton's new National




Eric Schmitt, "Charting a Course at the Pentagon, Aspin Uses His
Congressional Map," The New York Times, 17 February 1993, A13.
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provide a vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad
policy guidance necessary for a detailed review of the Services roles, missions
and functions. According to Bob Woodward in a 21 February 1993 interview
with Les Aspin, "Nothing bothers Aspin more than using 'subjective analysis'
to make important decisions."157 Aspin has criticized Powell's Base Force
calling it "a defense budget by subtraction - simply buying less of the Cold
War forces."158 Woodward indicates that Aspin's "bottom-up review" is
essentially a systems analysis approach.159 The important point about Aspin's
systems analysis approach to restructuring the military is the impact it will
have on defense policy implementation. When the defense budget goes in
front of Congress, Aspin's recommendations will have concrete justifications.
Before Clinton and Aspin can go forward with defense reorganization,
Aspin must have the support of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Services. This may prove to be as formidable a challenge as dealing with
Congress. According to Michael Gordon of the New York Times, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff told Congress on 19 May 1993, that "the readiness to go to war
157Bob Woodward, "The Secretary Of Analysis," The Washington Post






could be jeopardized by continued reductions in spending."160 Gordon asserts
that the JCS warning was an indirect criticism of President Clinton's plans to
trim military spending and opens up a "touchy political issue" for Clinton, who
claims he is cutting the military responsibly and is not anti-military.161
The importance of having the CJCS and the Services on-board with
SecDef Les Aspin magnifies the upcoming retirement of General Colin Powell.
It will be critical for the Clinton Administration to select a new Chairman that
has a vision in line with its own. Tradition indicates the Air Force is next in
line for the premier military post. In addition, the selection of the CJCS post
is not intended to be a politicized process. However, tradition will not
outweigh the need for Les Aspin to make the right political choice.
In a move to protect the Clinton Administration from charges it is cutting
defense spending too deeply, Aspin has appointed a panel of eight retired
generals and admirals to explore the effects of budget cuts and to find better
ways to measure the military.162 Aspin's move has created tension between
himself and pentagon officials. Speaking in anonymity, military officials
stated they thought "Mr. Aspin was trying to usurp responsibilities normally
carried out by the military and to take the political initiative on an issue that
160Michael Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Warn Congress Against More Military






was a serious political liability for the last Democratic Administration."163
Although heads are bumping now, Aspin's best shot at bringing the JCS and
Services aboard will be his command of military and defense issues and
leadership ability. If Aspin fails and the Services play their threat and
uncertainty card successfully with Congress, the future characteristic of U.S.
military forces will be nothing more than a smaller version of what we
currently have.
In conclusion, this chapter has examined constraints and implications in
defense policymaking for the post-Cold War era from three separate
perspectives. The first perspective was that of Congress. This section focused
on Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that seeks to
eliminate duplication and inefficiencies within the Services roles and missions.
Critics argue that Congress as an institution is not well suited to carryout
defense policy formulation. Robert Art supports this maxim stating, "As a
decentralized institution, Congress can never achieve the degree of centralized
control that is requisite to develop, coordinate, and reconcile competing policy
positions. . . ."164 On the other hand, analysts like James Lindsay argue that
incentives exist for Congressional members to take on policy issues. Lindsay
U3Ibid.
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identifies parochialism, ambition and duty as incentives for congressional
members to tackle defense policy issues.
In the book, Congress And Nuclear Weapons, James Lindsay argues that
congressional decisionmaking can be explained by viewing the process through
three "conceptual lenses": deferential, parochial and policy. It is through these
lenses that I argue Congress's ability to formulate and implement defense
policy relating to the roles and missions debate can best be explained. The
policy lens best explains Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and
inefficiencies. However, when congressional members begin to measure the
affects of defense reorganization in their own districts legislators will be driven
by "pork instincts" in an attempt to protect constituent benefits. The parochial
lens in this case offers the best explanation of Congress' defense policymaking
ability.
The second perspective is that of the Services. The Services are the least
likely group capable of proposing any wholesale changes that would eliminate
duplication and inefficiencies in their roles and missions. I argue that
institutional barriers, sunk costs and the use of uncertainty and threat all factor
in the inability of the Services to reform themselves.
The third perspective is that of the Executive Branch. I argue that Defense
Secretary Les Aspin, with his congressional experience, has the best
opportunity to formulate and implement significant defense reform. However,
his success is dependent upon several factors. First, President Clinton must be
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prepared to back Aspin with the required political capital. It is questionable
as to how much support Clinton will be able to provide the Secretary of
Defense in light of his failed economic stimulus package and his current
battles over gays in the military and Energy Bill. Second, the Clinton
Administration must produce a National Security Strategy that provides a
vision outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy
guidance necessary for a detailed review of service roles and missions. Finally,
Aspin must have the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services if he is
to be successful. This may prove to be the most difficult hurdle for Aspin of
the three. In light of this factor, Aspin must make the right choice in the
repalacement of General Colin Powell. The new Chairman must possess vision
and strong leadership capable of uniting the Services in support of a reform
effort. The Joint Chiefs have already waived the warning flag in front of
Congress stressing that the readiness of the Military to go to war could be
jeopardized by continued reductions in spending.
86
VI CONCLUSION
The geopolitical changes that have fundamentally altered the threats to
U.S. national security combined with rising budget deficits have created an
opportunity and necessity for changp throughout the Department of Defense.
These events will not only reduce the size of the defense budget, but propel an
overall reconsideration of the Services roles, missions and functions. Senator
Sam Nunn SASC Chairman, in a July 2 floor speech entitled, The Defense
Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services Roles And Missions, argued
that our nation can no longer afford inter-service rivalry, and that redundancy
and duplication in the current allocation of roles and missions is costing
billions of dollars each year.
Senator NuruVs speech on the Senate floor was a mandate for inter-service
debate over roles and missions. The essence of his mandate is his fear that a
failure to eliminate needless duplication and inefficiencies within the Services
will lead to a "diminished" military capability. Nunn's speech was given in
anticipation of General Powell's February 1993 report entitled, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed
Forces of the United States. Powell's report suggested ways to make the
military more efficient, but did not call for radically reshaping the four
Services. The report "rebuffed" the type of consolidation that Congress and
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President Clinton has called for. The dissatisfaction with the report for its
possible lack of vision, highlights what is fast becoming the preeminent
defense policy issue of the post-Cold War era.
In response to this defense policy issue, this thesis has examined the
ability of the President, Congress and Armed Services to formulate and
implement defense policy that eliminates duplication and inefficiencies within
service roles, missions and functions. I argued that the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in conjunction with the four military Services are unable as an organization to
formulate any significant changes in their roles, missions and functions. In
support of this claim, the first evidence presented stems from a dichotomy
between what the Services see as significant change (read structure) and what
Congress sees (read budget). Analysis provided in Chapter IV by Mackubin
Thomas Owens puts this dichotomy into perspective. He argues that the
Strategist (Services), seek military effectiveness at the cost of efficiency as
opposed to Congress which seeks efficiency. The strategist also sees
duplication as the military obligation to have enough means to ensure victory.
In addition, it is complimentary and provides a broad range of unique
capabilities that can be brought to bear as required by the situation. Where
Congress may see wasteful duplication, the military planner sees an array of
tools that will allow him/her to carryout a variety of operations and meet
strategic requirements.
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The dichotomy between the Services and Congress is not the only reason
the Services are incapable of producing significant reform. Chapter V
articulates three factors: institutional barriers, sunk costs and the political force
of uncertainty and threat. Institutional barriers exists because large
organizations have a built-in resistance to change. Carl Builder's analysis of
the Services, illustrate that each service has distinct and enduring personalties
that govern much of their behavior. According to Builder, the Navy is the most
independent of the Services and would prefer to be given a mission, retain
complete control over all the assets, and be left alone. General David Jones
offers his own analysis of DOD indicating, "The Defense Department has
evolved into a grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies-services, agencies, staffs,
boards and committees-which embrace the past and adapt new technology to
fit traditional missions and methods."165
"Sunk costs" also produce barriers that prevent consolidating or
eliminating duplicative activities. Utilizing William Lucas's and Raymond
Dawson's analysis, I argue that, using the budget as an instrument of control
is ineffective because "sunk costs" make it far easier to accept the existing
duplication. The impact of "sunk costs" determining the fate of a particular
mission or function can be seen in General Powell's current roles and missions
report. The concept of consolidating and moving Navy, Marine Corps, and
165SASC Staff report, The Need For Change, 624.
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Coast Guard helicopter training from Pensacola, Florida to Fort Rucker,
Alabama, is just one example provided, that is being considered based on its
"sunk costs".
Uncertainty and threat also creates disadvantages for reducing duplication
for the DOD. The Navy played both the uncertainty and threat card to
Congress in the B-36 and super-carrier conflict. The Navy's success at creating
uncertainty on the reliability of the B-36 as a weapon sufficiently capable of
delivering an atomic bomb on target, assured the Navy of a strategic bombing
role for Navy aviation. The magnitude of the Soviet threat magnified the need
for certainty. The Services have competed in risk-reduction by advancing
individual programs; thus, Congress was compelled throughout the Cold War
to appropriate programs at the hand of service manipulation of uncertainty.
The importance of threat and uncertainty plays an important role even today.
It works both ways, as well. Just as the Services utilized the fear of
uncertainty, Congress can eliminate individual programs i.e., SDI, based on a
level of certainty that the threat that created the program is no longer real.
Congress' ability to formulate and implement defense policy that realigns,
consolidates or abolishes service roles and missions, is much harder to
determine. I argue three reasons as to why Congress is not well suited to
formulate defense policy that seeks to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies
within service roles and missions. First, formulating defense policy regarding
service roles and missions would be doing what critics argue as something it
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is institutionally not well suited to do. Robert Art argues it is the job of the
Executive Branch to initiate policy and that of the Congress to judge policy.
Although "Congress tends to abhor a policy vacuum," and will push for
their own proposals for change, this is not the case with roles and missions.166
This leads to the second reason: the impact upon the budget. Unlike past
reform efforts that were centered around structure and authority i.e.,
Goldwater-Nichols, legislation associated with reorganizing service roles and
missions is centered around budget line-items. The third point is constituent-
oriented concerns. Eliminating roles md missions may prove too difficult for
legislators who are less concerned with formulating policy and more concerned
with satisfying narrow constituent-oriented concerns.
Although Congress can play a "de facto" role in the implementation of
defense policy through the appropriations process by altering funding levels,
I conclude that Congress will find it difficult to implement broad policy that
alters, consolidates or eliminates service roles and missions. I utilize James
Lindsay's "conceptual lens" approach to explain this contention. I argue that
Senator Nunn's quest to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies is best
explained through Lindsay's policy lens. The substantive issues surrounding
roles and missions has provided an excellent stage to appear "statesmanlike"
and responsible. Anticipating the absence of any significant change in General
166Stockton, Congress and Defense Policymaking, 28.
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Powell's roles and missions report, Senator Nunn saw the opportunity to take
centerstage on such a controversial policy issue.
Regardless of who formulates defense policy, when recommendations are
made as to where cuts will come from, congressional members will begin to
measure the affects of defense reorganization in their own districts and
challenge recommendations that hit the hardest. In this light, Lindsay's
parochial lens best explains Congress' ability to handle the roles and missions
debate. Because roles and missions impacts practically every spending category
within DOD, and closely resembles the base closure debates, Congress may
have to take a similar approach to eliminating duplication, as it did with the
base closure commission.
I argue that the Executive Branch under the leadership of Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin has the best opportunity to formulate and implement
significant defense policy. Several factors are presented in Chapter V that must
occur, if Aspin is to be successful. First, Clinton must back Aspin with the
required political capital. Second, the Clinton Administration must produce a
National Security Strategy and Military Strategy that provides a vision
outlining U.S. interests and objectives that will serve as broad policy guidance
necessary for a detailed review of roles and missions. Third, Aspin must have
the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. The upcoming
selection of the new CJCS is critical to the administration. Their choice must
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be visionary and posses strong leadership that can unite the Services in
supporting future reform.
Les Aspin's congressional experience coupled with his systems analyst
approach to doing business, will prove successful in his quest to shape the
Services for a post-Cold War environment. Aware of institutional and
bureaucratic barriers, Aspin will seek a defense policy that reflects his
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